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Abstract
Open source information, here defined as publicly available information that anyone can
lawfully obtain by request, purchase, or observation is playing an increasing role in treaty
monitoring, compliance verification and control. The increasing availability of data from
a growing number of sources on a vast range of topics has the potential to provide cues
about complex programmes subject to international treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
This report suggests a system's thinking view of open source analysis in support to non-
proliferation analysis, identifying the possible dimensions (hard/soft/context) involved and
discussing different types of scenarios an open source analyst might face.
Modelling a nuclear engineering programme by explicitly acknowledging the peculiarities of
its hard and soft layers allows the analyst to consider which are the types of insights that
each layer can provide and which is the the best tool/technique to investigate them.
Once a particular analysis is set, the analyst might face different types of analysis scenarios,
according to the type of the problem to be tackled and the type of data at his disposal. An
open source analyst in support of non-proliferation will also have to handle many different
forms of uncertainties, whose proper understanding is critical for the analyst to perform
dependable assessments and for the decision maker to take properly informed decisions.
A system's thinking approach to open source analysis has the potential to integrate syner-
gically with the other tools available in the international treaty monitoring toolkit, helping
in increasing the international community's confidence in its ability to detect an undeclared
proliferation programme.
4
1 Introduction
Nuclear energy programmes are complex, long-term endeavours, involving multiple sites
and a substantial number of personnel with a wide range of expertise. States willing to em-
bark in such an enterprise would have to either sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and benefit from the transfer of technology enabled by its member-
ship or develop the necessary science, technology and industrial capability autonomously.
States signatories of the NPT renounce the possibility to develop a nuclear military pro-
gramme and are subject to international nuclear safeguards implemented by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Within its State Level Concept [1], the IAEA envisions an objective-based and information-
driven approach for designing and implementing State Level Approaches (SLAs). To achieve
its objectives the Agency foresees the adoption of a holistic approach, in which all the infor-
mation gathered is analyzed and assessed as a whole . . . to draw and maintain a conclu-
sion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that State. ( [2], p. 20)
While the Agency, in its assessment, performs an all-source analysis making use of all the
information and knowledge available to it1 [3], either closed-source (official State's decla-
rations, inspection data, third parties information) or open source, other treaty monitoring
regimes often rely on fewer potential sources. No matter the domain in which open source
analysis is employed to inform international treaties monitoring, the IAEA intuition about
the need for holism to be effective needs to be seriously taken into account.
This report investigates the potential of open source analysis in support to non-proliferation
adopting a systems thinking approach. The starting point of the investigation is the ac-
knowledgement that every engineering project implies the complex interaction between
hard technical systems and infrastructures and soft, social systems (the people and or-
ganizations that operate and interact with the technical systems), within a given geopolitical
and social context. Each of these three layers potentially generates observables that might
be captured by open source monitoring. Although these observablestaken by themselves
are usually too weekly correlated to a nuclear programme to be relevant, when linked to
other week observables they might form an overall picture compatible with the existence
of such a programme.
The reader will be guided trough an overview of what is open source analysis (section 2)
when taking a holistic perspective and how it could be used to detect and monitor a com-
plex engineering programme as a nuclear energy programme, here described adopting a
systems thinking, holistic [4] point of view (section 3). In the process, some examples
on how this could be applied to nuclear non proliferation are provided. Finally, section 4
proposes some reflections on possible types of open source analysis scenarios that can be
encountered when analysing complex programmes for treaty monitoring purposes.
1 In this respect, although they do collect and make use of open source information, the IAEA analysts are here
considered not to be open source analysts.
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2 Some Preliminary Definitions
Objectives for this section:
• To provide a definition of Open Source Information Analysis.
• To define the system to be analyzed according to the Doing It Differently(DID) Systems
Thinking approach.
2.1 Defining Open Source Information
There is no normative definition of open source information that is universally accepted, as
there is no universal definition for open source analysis. For this exposition, open source
information will be defined as publicly available material that anyone can lawfully obtain
by request, purchase, or observation. ( [5], p. 5) This definition is very broad, and covers
a very vast range of potential sources of information. For instance, the IAEA sets it to
include information generally available from external sources, such as scientific literature,
official information, information issued by public organizations, commercial companies and
the news media, and commercial satellite imagery  ( [6], p.10) and trade analysis [7,8].
While classified information is certainly outside the open source information envelope, the
exact boundaries of this envelope are not well defined: in come cases e.g. grey literature
is considered to be open source [9], even if technically not reachable by everybody.
2.2 Defining the System to be Analyzed: a Systems Thinking Ap-
proach
There are many ways of formalizing a complex engineering programme, investigated by
the Systems Engineering discipline.2 Depending on the final goal one might work better
than another. This discussion will propose a formalization of a complex system adapted
from the Doing it Differently (DID) approach [14], originally conceived to bring a holistic
approach to the construction industry and then explored in several other fields, including
that of nuclear proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems3 [15] and nuclear safe-
guards [16].
A central idea in the DID approach is the fact that complex issues involve many different
players with diverse needs, wants and objectives which must be taken into due account.
In the DID approach everything is modelled as a process.
A process is defined by setting out the need for its existence and how it develops through
time towards its objectives. The first process is that of being. The very fact of existing
through time involves changes that might have considerable impact on the eventual suc-
cess of the project.
Every process involves an interaction between hard , technical systems (which might be
very basic equipment/products to be used or very complex technical systems to be op-
erated) and soft, social systems (the behaviour of people who play various roles in the
2 As Dori and Sillito pointed out [10], the concept system is used in science since the times of Aristotle, who
affirmed that the whole is something over and above its parts, and not just the sum of them all. ( [11],
quoted in [10], p. 209). Despite this, the definition of system in modern science is still not universally
codified. [10] Similarly, also modern Systems Engineering doesn't have a universally codified definition. Here
Systems Engineering will be defined as . . . a discipline that concentrates on the design and application of the
whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account
all the facets and all the variables and relating the social to the technical aspect. ( [12], quoted in [13])
3 The presentation of the DID approach outlined here is reproduced and adapted from [15], Appendix I.
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Figure 1: System's hard, soft and context layers adapted from [14].
process and who will interact with the hard system). All of this is set within a given con-
text [17] (Fig. 1).
Each process is considered to be a holon, i.e. both a whole and a part [4]. Every process is
a whole made up of the hard and soft layers that interact to produce change, but it is also
a part of other processes to which it contributes. For example a nuclear reactor is a whole
made up of all the primary and subsidiary technical systems operated by the personnel of
the site and according to the regulatory framework (process operating a nuclear power
plant). The reactor is also a part of the overall nuclear fuel cycle in which it is embedded
(process operating a civilian nuclear fuel cycle) [15].
The complexity of a programme is described as a process view where the traditional separa-
tion of the hard technical layer from the soft social one and the context in which they take
place is replaced by a systemic comprehensive view of all aspects, where the processes
of a complex system are organised into a hierarchical structure with increasing levels of
definition.
2.3 Defining Open Source Information Analysis
Within a systems thinking approach, open source analysis could be seen as a process of
getting the right information (what) to the right people (who) at the right time (when)
for the right purpose (why) in the right forum (where) and in the right way (how) ( [17],
p. 190) by merging openly available data and information coming from a wide variety of
accessible sources into an overall comprehensive and cohesive picture. Usually the process
involves the gathering and analysis of a large amount of data and information, a very small
percentage of it being relevant. A common scenario involves filtering an enormous amount
of data to end up with a sparse and incomplete set of information not all of which contributes
to knowledge [18]. When investigating a covert engineering programme, the analyst will
have to deal with low quality data and is always exposed to deliberate deception [19,20].
Nonetheless, the analyst may be able to obtain valuable insights about what a State might
be pursuing.
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3 An Integrated Approach to Monitoring an Engineering Pro-
gramme
Objectives for this section:
• To introduce Hard and Soft Layers' observables and the insights they might provide to
the analyst.
• To reflect on the importance of the context in which a system operates.
• To reflect on the uncertainties an analyst needs to cope with when dealing with open
source information in support to non-proliferation.
• To illustrate, via a non-nuclear example, how the observables from all the existing
layers can be merged into a consistent and informative picture.
3.1 Hard Layers' Observables
The hard layer of an engineering programme refers to its technical infrastructure. The ob-
servables typically relate to the existence and functioning of the technical infrastructure of
the system. They provide information about the topology, layout, shape and sizes of the
infrastructure. When peculiar shapes are recognizable (e.g. the reactor dome of a nuclear
power plant), they give the analyst the opportunity to gain insights about the technical
layer's function.
Usually these observables are continuously available (e.g. the visual signature of a building
is always available for collection), butat least in the field of open source analysissignals
collection is discontinuous to varying degrees (e.g. the visual signature of a building will
be captured only during an overhead passage of a imagery commercial satellite).
Since the technical infrastructure is generally geo-localized, the data gathered is mostly
structured information, and can be processed and analyzed with geospatial tools.
Examples of open source information related to hard layers' observables are obtained
through satellite/overhead imagery and remote sensing in general [21]. These techniques
already demonstrated their effectiveness in analyzing and monitoring nuclear-related sites
to gain knowledge of their status and activities, both in the field of nuclear safeguards and
non-proliferation. For instance, the interest in monitoring proliferation sensitive fuel cycle
steps such as irradiation in reactors and enrichment via remote sensing is not new [22,23]
and e.g. the nuclear-related sites in Iran have been extensively monitored in the last years
by NGOs active in the field of nuclear non-proliferation (see e.g. [24]). The DPRK nuclear
test site has been object of several geospatial analyses, published both in scientific journals
(see e.g. [25,26]) and non-proliferation blogs (see e.g. [27,28]). Open source analysis has
also investigated sites that underwent nuclear accidents [29,30]. Fig. 2 provides an exam-
ple of open source analysis of technical infrastructure through the use of remote sensors
and satellite imagery as presented in [21].
3.2 Soft Layers' Observables
The soft layer of an engineering programme relates to the people that conceive, design,
build and operate the hard layer under investigation. This layer gives the possibility to look
into the social aspect of the programme under analysis, and gives the analyst the possibil-
ity to gain insights about the function of the various parts of the infrastructure, the people
working in and operating it, the working security rules and policies of the system, together
with hints about the context to which the process belongs.
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Figure 2: Multi-satellite, multi-sensor [analysis] for verification applications. The figure shows the North Korean
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon. The original cascade hall was visited by Dr. Siegfried
Hecker in 2010 [31]. In 2013, what appeared to be a duplicate cascade hall and probable expanded control room
were constructed. The low resolution LANDSAT thermal imagery directed [the] analytical focus to an area where
cooling towers were identified with higher (finer) resolution optical imagery. While the lower (coarser) resolution
thermal imagery could not distinguish whether one or both towers were operational in September 2014, the
January 2014 DigitalGlobe finer resolution imagery (as is viewable with Google Earth) suggests that both were
possibly operating as early as January 2014. ( [21])
9
Signal emitters of a soft layer include the people themselves. In addition to the scien-
tific literature and traditional media sources, the advent of the internet and social net-
works [32,33], coupled with the technological advancements in the field of mobile connec-
tivity, led to the fact that nowadays many people own and regularly use internet-enabled
camera phones. The penetration of smartphones worldwide grew globally from 15% in
2012 to 24% in 2014 ( [34], p. 1) and in 2016 31.2% of the world population is foreseen
to own at least one smartphone and use the smartphone(s) at least once per month.
( [35]) Evidence suggests that in remote rural areas, if mobile connectivity is available,
their adoption rate is not far from the one experienced in urban areas [34].
Where people have access to reliable connectivity as in the European Union and in the
Unites States of America, a high percentage of them regularly uses one or more social
networks. In the US in 2014 52% of online adults [used] two or more social media sites.
( [36], p. 2) Having a cameraphone in one's pocket increases the likelyhood of having
people sharing pictures of the places and events they frequent, to the extent that in 2014
the photo sharing social network flickr.com saw an average number of photos shared per
day of 1 million4 and in 2015 the average daily images upload on Instagram was in the
range of 70 million.
Compared to the observables for the hard layer described in section 3.1, soft layer observ-
ables are discontinuous in nature (the single person publishes or posts only once in a while),
but the enormous number of potential emitters still provides a remarkable signalalbeit
most of it is, from a Treaty monitoring perspective, just noise. Contrary to the hard layer's
observables, some of the soft ones enable potential continuous collection to the open source
analyst: posts on social networks such as Twitter or Instagram can be monitored near-real
time, and the same is technically possible with (micro-)blogs and online media sources [37].
The information collected can either be geo-referenced (as in the case of some social net-
work posts) or unstructured (as in the case of scientific and official literature, online blogs,
online and traditional media).
When social networks data are analysed, the analyst is potentially able to derive information
from much more than just the actual content shared by the user. In particular, the following
aspects of social networks' posts can be of potential interest:
• Layout patterns: when geo-referenced, the pattern of the posts (i.e. from where the
information was being posted) can reveal useful information about e.g. the security
rules of a nuclear site. When analysed over a long enough period of time, the pattern
would reveal e.g. whether the site allows smartphones use or not, and in case re-
strictions are limited to some areas and buildings, which are the buildings interested
to this limitation. Usually civilian nuclear research sites are very active, but military
nuclear sites and research centres are virtually silent. Fig. 3 shows two different nu-
clear research centres and their respective integral social network signals layout over
a given period of time. It is evident how the two patterns are very different.
• Temporal patterns: temporal lines of posts from one source can provide insights of
the system's evolution (people and related activities being moved from one building to
another, dismissal of activities); concentration of posts from a given building in a given
period of the day (e.g. 12H0014H00) can provide insights of the function of a given
building (e.g. a building active between 12H0014H00 is likely the canteen/cafeteria),
providing hints of its function and level of sensitivity. Sharp increases or decreases at
certain periods of the day from the entire site might reveal the working habits, such
as usual working hours. Fig. 4 shows the use of social networks posts' temporal line
to acknowledge a given subject's relocation in a given date.
• Content, although most of the times irrelevant, can occasionally provide insights on the
type of activities and equipments involved e.g. in laboratories, or whether renovation
and refurbishment of the equipment is ongoing. Fig. 5 shows selected Social Network
posts uploaded from a nuclear research centre's experimental facility.
4 http://tinyurl.com/techcrunch-flickr, accessed on September, 5, 2018.
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Figure 3: Social Network integral signal layout on two different nuclear research centres. The one on the left is a
civilian nuclear research centre, the one on the right is a nuclear research centre related to the design of nuclear
warheads.
Monitoring news and social media allows the open source analyst to follow the develop-
ment and the evolution of the system under analysis in an almost dynamic way, resulting
in being potentially very useful in filling the gap between the availability of signals collected
from the hard layer. In particular, the structured information coming from social networks
posts and online collaboration efforts can allow the follow-up and analysis of events such
as radiological releases [38,39], accidents, riots and protests [40].
While it might be an issue for any type of open source [41], the soft layer's observables, es-
pecially those related to social network posts, face the risks of being unreliable, inaccurate,
or even subject to manipulation to misinform and deceive [20]. There have been cases of
States having allegedly set up troll farms as a part of a disinformation operation [42].
The analyst should therefore be aware of this possibility and look for possible corroboration
deriving from other independent sources.
3.3 Taking the Context into Account
Any human activity is shaped by and carried out within a particular context, the knowledge
of which might be extremely important for the understanding of the observed process.
The information about the context relates to the bigger picture of which the programme un-
der investigation is part. It can inform on both the hard and soft layers of the programme,
and is usually colored by biases and points of view.
Typically, the information related to the context is unstructured in nature, and comes from
a wide variety of sources, including news and media reports, international relationships and
obligations, political and government statements and acts.
The start of complex programmes such as a nuclear proliferation programme is often influ-
enced by the context perceived by the State initiating it, and influences how the programme
could be structured and carried out. For instance two programs, those of the United States
and Soviet Union, were unquestionably initiated in response to what were perceived as di-
11
Before a given date
After a given date
Image: DigitalGlobe via Google EarthElaboration: EC Joint Research Centre
Figure 4: Example of the analysis of Social Network posts temporal line. In this example before a given date a
given target was an active Social Network poster from a particular house. After the given date the posts of the
same target resulted to originate from another house. In that period the target likely relocated from the first
house to the second.
https:/www.flickr.com/photos/66080755@N06/7360658042  
http:/tinyurl.com/lu6n8mx 
https:/www.flickr.com/photos/66080755@N06/7360655668 
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Image: DigitalGlobe via Google Maps 
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Figure 5: Example of Social Network posts content analysis. The figure shows selected Social Network posts
uploaded from a nuclear research centre's experimental facility. As it is possible to see, the material posted might
help in gaining a flavour of the inside of the experimental facility.
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Figure 6: Snapshot of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle in 2013 and in 2014 as emerging from the IAEA Director
General reports to the IAEA Board of Governors [46,47]. The evolution of the programme would not be under-
standable without the knowledge of the geo-political context (signature of the EU/E3+3 and Iran Joint Plan of
Action related voluntary measures [48] foreseeing changes in the scope and operation of some Iranian nuclear
fuel cycle's facilities ).
rect outside threats and, in the rush to develop weapons, both the enriched uranium and
plutonium routes were pursued simultaneously. ( [43], p. 11)
Although there is no definitive answer to why states decide to start a nuclear weapons
programme and how influential the context may be [44,45], sometimes knowledge of the
external influencing factors is the only way to explain the observed evolution of a nuclear
programme. An example of how the context might be critical to understand the evolution
of a nuclear programme is provided in Fig. 6.
The figure shows two snapshots of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle: one in 2013 [46] and
another in 2014 [47]. While in 2013 the fuel cycle covered all the steps of an open fuel cycle
and presented a coherent picture from a process point of view, one year later the same
fuel cycle apparently evolved into a much less understandable picture. The explanation for
this evolution is the agreement between Iran and the EU/E3+3 (France, Germany, United
Kingdom, China, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the European Union)
on a Joint Plan of Action [48] that shaped its nuclear fuel cycle as depicted.
3.4 Uncertainty Identification and Management
Each time an assessment that needs some kind of decision making is carried out, the
aspect of uncertainty management plays an important role in ensuring that the analyst
could convey to the decision maker the most complete and dependable message. An Open
Source analysis in support of non-proliferation will have to handle many different forms of
uncertainties, whose proper understanding is critical for the analyst to perform dependable
assessments and for the decision maker to take properly informed decisions.
In general terms uncertainty could be categorized in two broad aspects: aleatory and epis-
13
temic5 [50]. Aleatory uncertainty relates to the intrinsic lack of specific pattern in the
data under investigation, and is commonly referred to as randomness. It is the domain
of classical probability theory and is intrinsic of the phenomenon under observation, i.e.
this source of uncertainty cannot be eliminated. Epistemic uncertainty relates to the im-
perfect knowledge of the subject/data by the analyst, and could in theorybut seldom in
practicebe eliminated. In any kind of analysis these two aspects are usually present and
distinguishable, but intertwined [51].
Gathering evidence for the presence of indicators of a nuclear engineering programme in a
state, especially when related to military aspects and therefore with active efforts to keep
it concealed, means having to deal with several epistemological issues:
• The analyst is out to detect something whose existence is uncertain.6 Making a par-
allelism with any classic measurement performed by an inspector on declared nuclear
material in a declared facility, [54,55] while the three postulates of the theory of mea-
surement [56] inform the latter that he will not ever know the absolute true value of
the characteristics he is measuring, they also inform him that the true value does exist
and it iswithin the limit of the typical safeguards measurement campaignsde facto
constant. When searching for indicators of a possible clandestine nuclear programme,
the analyst does not know whether such programme really exists.
• Assuming that the clandestine programme exists, the analyst does not know its char-
acteristics,7 and therefore would not be in the position to choose the best detection
method for finding indicators of its presence. This not only impacts effectiveness and
efficiency, but also adds considerable epistemic uncertainty about the outcome of the
verification activities.
• In addition to the above-mentioned issue, even in the case in which the analyst
chooses the appropriate method for detecting the existence of a given indicator, the
actual detection probability of the presence of an indicator given its existence when
using a given detection/measurement technique is often not known as no dependable
attempts to investigate this aspect are available.
In view of the above aspects, it is here necessary to introduce a further distinction related
to the epistemic uncertainty, that will be here further characterized in fuzziness and in-
completeness. [14,57,58] The first one (fuzziness, or imprecision of definition) pertains to
the inability to perfectly describe and characterize an aspect that the analyst knows be-
ing relevant to the analysis. The second one (incompleteness) acknowledges the fact that
the analyst deals with incomplete information, including both known unknowns and un-
known unknowns. This calls for an open world assumption8 while dealing with uncertainty
management and its formal treatment.9 This requires the relaxation of the additivity of
probabilities requirement10. [15] provides an overview of a possible way to account for all
the above types of uncertainties via the use of an adapted version of Interval Probability
Theory [57].
5 For additional possible distinctions and their interpretation see e.g. [49].
6 Actually the history of non-proliferation tells us that it is safe to assume that most of the times there is no
clandestine nuclear activity going on in a State. For an overview of past known proliferation efforts, see
e.g. [43,52,53]
7 Among all the possible variables, there are two main routes to nuclear proliferation: one foresees the acquisition
of weapons-usable plutonium as the main nuclear material for a nuclear weapons-arsenal and the other one
foresees the acquisition of highly-enriched uranium. The two routes imply different technologies and therefore
would produce different indicators. For an overview of the choices made by proliferators regarding these two
options, see e.g. [43].
8 The Open World Assumption (OWA) is the assumption that that what is not known to be true or false might be
true, or absence of information is interpreted as unknown information, not as negative information. It assumes
incomplete information about a given state of affairs, i.e., there may be more relevant information than what
is provided. ( [59])
9 Examples of uncertainty management approaches allowing an open world assumptions are e.g. [57,60,61].
10 The non-additivity of probabilities is not a recent concept: Bernoulli already accepted it in the XVII Century
when he tried to understand how could the force of different pieces of evidence be combined [62].
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3.5 Putting everything together: a non-nuclear Example
As an example of synergy of soft and hard layers' observables, Fig. 7 shows an effort to
locate the Ebola cemetery opened by the Liberian authorities out of Monrovia at the begin-
ning of 2015, based on the open source information available at that time.
In 2014 and 2015 Liberia experienced a dramatic outbreak of the Ebola virus, requiring a
coordinated international intervention in support to the Liberian authorities in coping with
this regional emergency. At the beginning of 2015, under the need to provide an alternative
to cremation for the Ebola virus victims, a new safe burial site was opened outside Monrovia.
Following the description of a blog post on openstreetmap and Google Earth, in March 2015
it was possible to identify a candidate area, but not to corroborate it as the last freely avail-
able high resolution satellite image dated back to 2013, well before the establishment of the
cemetery. Low resolution images from DigitalGlobe ImageFinder confirmed the presence
of new activities after the date of establishment of the cemetery but were not sufficient to
link the activities to the cemetery.
Investigating social network posts, some images on the UNMEER official Flickr account were
found , dated January 2015, related to the burial site (see Fig. 7). Despite the credibility of
the source, the geographical coordinates attached to the images did not seem to be con-
sistent neither with the very accurate driving directions given by the blog post nor with the
information that could be derived by low-resolution images via DigitalGlobe ImageFinder11.
Images uploaded on social networks taken around Decoration Day (a Liberian National Hol-
iday since 1916 in which the people remember their dead relatives i.a. by decorating their
graves) in the area under investigation corroborated the inaccuracy of the UNMEER images'
geotags and supported the candidate site identification. Another image uploaded in July
2015 further increased the confidence in the correct identification. Finally, in early 2016 a
new high resolution satellite image of the area was made available in Google Earth, which
confirmed the candidate site as the actual burial site.
This example shows how the use of social networks, collaborative tools and online blogs
can work synergistic with hard layers' observables such as high resolution satellite images
to inform the open source analyst about a particular site/system.
Soft layers' observables are also potentially able to fill the gap between the last available
satellite image and a given point in time, allowing the analyst to monitor the evolution of a
system through time in a more dependable way.
Knowledge of the context (existence and meaning of Decoration Day in the Liberian tradi-
tion) helped the analyst in focusing his attention on selected sources of information around
a precise point in time, allowing him to retrieve important information that proved valuable
to reach the investigation's goal.
The Example also highlighted how the use of open source information, even when coming
from reputable and credible sources, requires a careful vetting of its correctness before
being able to depend on it.
11 The images taken after the opening of the burial site did not show any significant activity in the area corre-
sponding to the images geographical coordinates.
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Background Image: Jan 2013
Likely safe burial site
Sharp right turn
Monrovia
Robertsfield highway
Place indicated by UNMEER 
geo-tagged pictures: do not 
match driving directions
Approx 1.6km
Mar 2015
Jul 2015
Jan 2015Jan 2015
Mar 2015 Mar 2015
Mar 2015
Sources: maps: OpenStreetMap
               Non-matching geo-tagged pics: UNMEER flickr account
Matching geo-tagged pics: Instagram: 
@iamjimtuttle (worker), @cariyell  (graves)
               Jan 2013 satellite images: Google Earth
               Mar 2015 satellite image: DigitalGlobe ImageFinder
ReliefWeb report http://reliefweb.int/report/liberia/safe-burial-ebola-victim-liberia
Liberia: A safe burial for an Ebola victim in Liberia
Original published date: 10 Feb 2015
Country:Liberia
Theme: Health, Water Sanitation Hygiene
Content format: News and Press Release
Language: English
Source: UN Children's Fund
Disaster type: Epidemic
Origin notes: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/liberia_79760.html?utm_source=unicef_news&utm_
medium=rss&utm_campaign=rss_link
By Helene Sandbu Ryeng
MONROVIA, Liberia, 9 February 2015 – “Drive along the Robertsfield highway
past Tower Hill, make a sharp right turn after you pass Ambush Curve, and proceed
a few hundred metres until you reach Disco Hill. It’s close to smell no taste.”
These are the directions to Liberia’s newest cemetery, one in which more than
350 people have been buried in a dignified – and safe – way.
Arm Bush Curve = Ambush Curve 
(i.e. typo in OSM)?
Aug 2015
Figure 7: Effort to use social media information to locate the ebola cemetery opened by the Liberian authorities
out of Monrovia at the beginning of 2015, being the last high-resolution satellite image of the area available
for free dating back to 2013. The bottom picture shows an August 2015 Satellite image of the identified area,
confirming the identification. Credits as in the figure, annotations: EC JRC.
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4 Types of OS Analysis Scenarios for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Objectives for this section:
• To introduce the possible types of OS analyses that could be performed to support
non-proliferation regimes.
• To provide examples of such analyses.
4.1 The OS Analysis for Nonproliferation Research Dimensions
As with any type of analysis, an Open Source analysis in support to nuclear non-proliferation
comprises a set of data to be analysed and a paradigm12 to make sense of those data.
Depending on the quality and quantity of the data that are potentially available and the
quality of the models13 at the analyst's disposal, four different analysis research dimensions
can be identified [65], illustrated in Table 1. To be able to effectively perform OS analysis
in support to nuclear non-proliferation, these scenarios are to be understood and assessed.
Table 1: Research dimensions for OS analysis applied to nuclear non-proliferation. General Frame adapted
from [65].
Paradigm Strength
Low High
Data Quality/Quantity
High Model Building Puzzle Solving
What could work for NP? How likely in NP?
Low Mystery Framing Data Foraging
How to find unknown unknowns? What and how in NP?
The following paragraphs will briefly discuss the four categories of Table 1. The concept is
illustrated in the following paragraphs by means of examples.
It has to be noted that the classification of the analysis as being part of one of the four
scenario types should not be considered to be rigid and depends on various factors, includ-
ing the analysis and the analyst: an analysis could fall into e.g. the data foraging category
for one analyst and into e.g. the model building one for another. In addition, an analysis
might start out as a mystery framing problem, which after new inputs can evolve into a
data foraging or a model building one, and (rarely) ending up in a puzzle solving exercise.
Section 4.5 provides an example of such migration from mystery framing through model
building and data foraging.
4.2 Puzzle Solving
When high quality data and and a well established paradigm with dependable models are
available to the analyst, the outcome of the analysis is usually dependable and the analyst's
role is that of gathering the data, processing them according to the need and visualizing
the outcome in the most suitable way. An example of puzzle solving analysis, in addition to
the description of the Iranian production nuclear fuel cycle depicted in Fig. 6, is shown in
Fig. 8. The information used comes mainly from the IAEA Director General reports to the
IAEA Board of Governors. The nuclear fuel cycle production processes are very well known
in their general terms and make for a high quality model for the purpose of the analysis.
The outcome can be considered as a dependable picture of the status of the Iranian nuclear
fuel cycle's declared processes.
12 Following Kuhn, a paradigm is here defined as universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time
provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. ( [63], p. viii)
13 A model is here defined as a physical, mathematical or logical representation of a system entity, phenomenon,
or process. ( [64], p. 105)
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Figure 8: Example of puzzle-solving OS analysis. The figure shows the name and location of the declared Iranian
nuclear facilities. The chart shows the overall evolution of the stock of UF6 enriched up to 20 % produced
in Iran between February 2010 and November 2015. The period includes the implementation of the EU/E3+3
and Iran Joint Plan of Action related voluntary measures [48] until the adoption of the EU/E3+3 and Iran Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) [66] in October 2015. Data taken from the IAEA Director General reports
to the IAEA Board of Governors.
While the Iran nuclear fuel cycle is a good example of puzzle solving, it is also a very
particular one. Usually the amount of information available on a nuclear fuel cycle is much
more limited and attributable to sources that are much less reliable than the IAEA. Thus, it
is not expected to see many puzzle solving problems in performing OS analysis in support
to nuclear non-proliferation.
4.3 Data Foraging
A more likely analysis scenario is one in which the paradigm is well established but depend-
able information is lacking. In this case, the main task and challenge for the OS analyst is
to find and collect data as dependably as possible, and the dependability of the analysis will
be mainly driven by the quality of the gathered data. This scenario also opens a research
dimension, i.e. to look into innovative ways of finding and collecting data that may not
have been generated/intended for non-proliferation analyses but can adequately cope with
the task.
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Name
Separative 
Power
(kg SWU / 
centrifuge / y)
Overall 
Height
(cm)
Length (casing)
(cm)
Diameter 
casing
(cm)
Rotor material
Rotor diameter
(cm)
Rotor length
(cm)
Number rotors Bellow material Number bellows Type
IR-1 0.9-2.1 185 170 16 Aluminum 10 35 4 Maraging steel 3 Supercritical
IR-2 100 80 22 Carbon Fibre 13 47 1 0 Subcritical
IR-2m 2.7-6.3 130 123 22 Carbon Fibre 14 54 2 Maraging steel 1 Supercritical
IR-3 102 73 22 Carbon Fibre 13 47 1 0 Subcritical
IR-4 2.7-6.3 141 123 22 Carbon Fibre 14 54 2 Carbon Fibre 1 Supercritical
IR-5
IR-6
IR-6s
IR-8 13.5-31.5, 24
Data based on IAEA reports, measurements or Iranian statements
Assessment
Derived numbers
Supercritical1285.4-12.6 115 29 Carbon Fibre 2 1
[1] 
[1] [1] 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] [1] http://multimedia.tasnimnews.com/Media/Gallery/287605 [3] http://tinyurl.com/8c5efn8  [2] http://tinyurl.com/l9c89lz 
Figure 9: Example of data foraging OS analysis: Iranian centrifuges. Despite the exceptional amount of open
information available about the Iranian nuclear programme, in 2014 little was known about the technical details
of the various types of centrifuges developed in Iran. The figure shows an attept to assemble and derive this
information from publicly available sources in 2014, making use i.a. of image analysis to derive the centrifuges
dimensions. Example taken from [67]. Image credits as in the figure. Analysis: R. Jungwirth.
An example of data foraging for a nuclear open source analysis is the one depicted in Fig.
9. While the knowledge of gas centrifuge enriching processes is well established in open
literature, despite the exceptional amount of information released on the Iranian nuclear
programme, at the time of this experiment (2014) little was available about the technical
details of the Iranian centrifuges. By merging different sources of open information, in-
cluding measurements derived from public photographs, the figure shows a 2014 attempt
to derive the main technical characteristics and parameters of some centrifuges types de-
veloped by Iran. Another example of data foraging is the characterization of the DPRK
Punggye-ri nuclear test site, with an effort to identify the exact location of the first four
nuclear tests (Fig. 10).
In some areas data foraging can be supported by ad hoc tools. For example, in the domain
of online news media monitoring tools to monitor, screen and collect information in multiple
languages [69,70] can inform the open source analyst and contribute to e.g. gaining early
awareness of nuclear-related activities [37].
As with any data gathering campaign, a critical point is being able to assess how much
information is enough. Having more information does not necessarily increase the ac-
curacy of an analysis: studies show that once an experienced analyst has the minimum
information necessary to make an informed judgment, obtaining additional information
generally does not improve the accuracy of his or her estimates. Additional information
does, however, lead the analyst to become more confident in the judgment, to the point of
overconfidence. ( [71], p. 52)
4.4 Model Building
Sometimes reliable data could be gathered, but the available paradigms are not adequate
for making sense of the information there hidden. Where models are known, most of the
times they are classified and cannot be considered being available in the public domain.
There are therefore areas of investigation where a model building activity is necessary to
be able to conduct an open source analysis. As mentioned, sometimes this activity is aimed
at rediscovering in the public domain what is already known in classified environments,
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Figure 10: Example of data foraging OS analysis: geo-localization of the first four DPRK nuclear tests. Overview
of the North Korea's Nuclear Test at Punggye-ri with Google Earth visualization of the CTBTO relative test locations
plot released on January, 7, 2016. The georeferencing has been performed in line with the findings of Koblentz
and Pabian about the characterization of the Punggye-ri test site. [68] The locations of the four existing tunnel
portals and the central test support area are also shown. Image and analysis credit: F. Pabian.
as in the case of the suitability of the nuclear material available in a commercial nuclear
fuel cycle for a military nuclear programme [7275].
Sometimes there is a need to investigate the signature of nuclear facilities to compare
with data and signals gathered from the open source domain:14 in early 2015, a German
magazine published a reportage speculating on the possibility that a given site in Syria
might have hosted an underground nuclear reactor. [76] Many commentators and nuclear
experts dismissed the possibility based on the fact that the typical signatures of nuclear re-
actor cooling systems were missing.15 [77] The episode triggered the question would it be
possible to cool a small research reactor using ground-water only? And if it were possible,
which would be the related signature available to a non-proliferation analyst?. JRC carried
out a model building exercise to try answering this question, highlighting the theoretical
feasibility of this cooling approach, which would result in a signature substantially different
from the one of typical research reactors cooling systems (Fig.11). [78]
Even when a well established and dependable paradigm is available, identifying the right
model for a given analysis is a complicated task. For example, in an analysis of the tech-
nical difficulty for a given State to set up and operate e.g. a gas centrifuge enrichment
facilitytypical of an acquisition pathways analysis [79], it might be very difficult to select
14 for other examples, see also [22,23]
15 The dismissal was mainly based on the issue of water management and the use of a near-by lake or river as
a water source. The article reports that experts have observed that the absence of large pipes that would be
essential to supply a reactor with large amounts of water undermines Follath's conclusion. After all, there is a
reason why such reactors are built near rivers. [77]
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Figure 11: Example of model building OS analysis. Understanding operating principles of ground source cooling
and potential signatures aids detection and deters construction. Challenges include ensuring sufficient recharge
flow to prevent production well dry-out and overcoming structural engineering challenges on permeable founda-
tions. If successfully implemented, the resulting signature is substantially different from that of typical research
reactors cooling systems. [78]
the most appropriate model. Indeed, . . . some analysts have claimed that `. . . all enrich-
ment techniques demand sophisticated technology in large and expensive facilities' ( [80],
p. 31), suggesting that enrichment is out of reach of all but the most capable States. In
contrast, others suggest that a small centrifuge plant is `feasible for countries with no prior
experience, that possess relatively little technical skills and which have relatively little in-
dustrial activity.' ( [81], p. 47). ( [82], p. 6)
In this scenario, the dependability of the analysis will mainly depend on the quality of the
model and on the final goal of the analysis.
4.5 Mystery Framing
In a nuclear proliferation effort the information related to the programme is usually a
closely guarded secret, and both data and possible related models are unknown or highly
uncertain. When both the quality of the data and the model are poor, the analyst faces a
mystery framing scenario. This is typical of looking for clandestine nuclear weaponization
activities, and is usually addressed by national intelligence services. Open source analysis
could theoretically play a role but has to face formidable challenges in both data gathering
and modelling. Moreover, failing in detecting a signal cannot lead to conclude the absence
of a nuclear military activity.
Occasionally, the analyst stumbles into ambiguous data that do not fit neatly into any
known signature but still cannot be dismissed as innocuous (or when there are multiple
competing hypothesis that seem plausible). These are sometimes referred to as enigmas,
and are another form of mystery framing. Usually the analysts facing enigmas will try to
shift the scenario from a mystery framing one to either a model building or a data foraging
oneoften both. The closest non-classified example of an enigma in the nuclear non-
proliferation community known to the authors was the Dair Alzour site in Syria, which was
evidently subject to an air strike in September 2007.16 In the aftermath of the air strike,
that caused surprise in the open source community, the claims that the destroyed site was
16 For a reconstruction of the events, see e.g. [83]
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Figure 12: Example of model building applyed to an enigma. The Figure shows an example of model building
applied to the Al Kibar site to verify the possibility that the available data could be compatible with the presence of
a Yong-byon-like research reactor. The top left images show the camouflage efforts to make the Al Kibar building
looking like a typical byzantine fortressjust bigger. The center and bottom-right images show how the different
size and shape of the Al Kibar building and the Yongbyon research reactor could be reconciled. The Figure is
adapted from [89]. Analysis performed by F. Pabian and adapted with permission.
hosting a nuclear reactor [84] gave the analysts the possibility to switch the scenario to a
data foraging one, as they started to gather as much evidence as possible to support or
dismiss the claim. Some analysts disputed the possibility that the destroyed building could
have been a nuclear reactor on the grounds that many of the usual signatures associated
to this type of facility, such as  barbed wire or air defenses that would normally ring
a sensitive military facility ( [85]) were not evident. Others investigated whether this
discrepancy between the observed signature and the expected one could have been the
outcome of a complex concealment effort [86, 87], thus shifting again to a new analysis
scenario: the model building one to see if a credible signature suppression effort might
have been compatible with the observed data (see Fig. 12). In 2011 the IAEA assessed
that . . . the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor. . .  ( [88], para. 24).
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5 Conclusions
Proliferation efforts are complex engineering programmes lasting several years, involv-
ing multiple sites and a lot of human resources with a wide range of expertise. As such,
they are prone to leave behind several traces and potential cues that can be identified and
monitored via open source analysis with varying degrees of success.
Within a systems thinking approach, open source analysis can be used to gain an insight
of a given programme. Usually the process involves the gathering and analysis of a large
amount of data and information, a very small percentage of it being relevant. The most
common scenario implies filtering an enormous amount of data to end up with a sparse
and heavily incomplete set of information to work with. When looking for a covert military
engineering programme, the analyst will have to deal with low quality data and is always
exposed to deliberate deception. Nonetheless, the insights that this overall picture could
provide to the analyst is able to give him valuable insights about what a State might be
pursuing.
This report suggested a system's thinking view of open source analysis in support to non-
proliferation, identifying the possible dimensions involved and discussing different types of
scenarios an open source analyst might face.
Modelling a nuclear engineering programme by explicitly acknowledging the peculiarities of
its hard and soft layers allows the analyst to consider which are the types of insights that
each layer can provide and which is the the best tool/technique to investigate them.
The hard layer can provide primary evidence of an infrastructure's topology, layout, shape
and sizes. In many cases, the infrastructure's functions and operational status can be
observed or deduced. The intrinsic geo-localization of this type of information allows and
simplifies its representation in a visual form by overlaying it to satellite, aerial or ground
imagery. The persistence of the signal emission can theoretically enable continuous signal
collection, although in practice open source analyst would seldom be able to achieve it.
The soft layer can effectively corroborate and complement the information obtained by the
hard layer signatures by providing insights on the people and the social organization oper-
ating the infrastructure. In particular, the possibility to monitor the social network activity
of a given site or company can provide insights about the security practices (and therefore
the potential sensitivity of the activities performed) and the evolution of a system (e.g.
people and related activities being moved from one building to another, laboratory renova-
tions and refurbishments, dismissal of activities). Some soft layer signals can in principle
be subject to 24/7 monitoring by an open source analyst, and might provide a dynamic
way of following the development and the evolution of a system potentially able to fill the
temporal knowledge gap between the the availability of signals collected from the hard layer.
While the importance of the context in which a programme is conceived and deployed is
often overlooked by technical analysts, it is essential to understand the evolution of a given
programme and can provide valuable insights to the analyst on what, where and when to
search for a particular signal/piece of information. Although the geo-political context is
often a factor that cannot play a role in the estimation of a given metric, its knowledge
often provides invaluable information for the understanding of the collected data.
Once a particular analysis is set, the analyst might face different types of analysis scenar-
ios, according to the type of the problem to be tackled and the type of data at his disposal.
When high quality data and a well established paradigm with dependable models are avail-
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able to the analyst, he/she deals with a puzzle solving type of analysis. The outcome can
be considered as a dependable picture of the programme aspect under analysis.
When the analyst can rely on a well established paradigm but lacks dependable information,
he/she is confronted with a data foraging type of analysis. The main task and challenge
is to find and collect data as dependably as possible. The analysis dependability will be
driven by the quality of the gathered data.
In cases where high quality data can be collected, but no dependable paradigm to make
sense of those data is available, the analyst faces a model building type of analysis. The
main challenge lies with the ability to build a dependable model to make sense of the avail-
able data, and the dependability of the analysis will mirror that of the model.
Sometimes the analyst is confronted with ambiguous data that do not fit into any known
signature but still cannot be dismissed as innocuous. Given the fact that nuclear prolifer-
ation programmes are usually a closely guarded secret, analysts might be faced with both
low quality data and models. To evolve, this mystery framing type of analysis will have
to either improve the quality and quantity of data or (data foraging) or find a suitable
paradigm for making sense of the available data (model building), or more probably a
combination of both.
An open source analyst in support of non-proliferation will have to handle many different
forms of uncertainties, whose proper understanding is critical for the analyst to perform
dependable assessments ad for the decision maker to take properly informed decisions.
Gathering evidence for the presence of indicators of a nuclear engineering programme in
a state implies dealing with several epistemic issues, requiring a specific categorization
in terms of fuzziness (impreciseness of definition) and incompleteness (existence of both
known unknowns and unknown unknowns). An open world assumption might be ben-
eficial to capture uncertainties related to these types of analysis.
A system's thinking approach to open source analysis has the potential to integrate syner-
gically with the other tools available in the international treaty monitoring toolkit, helping
in increasing the international community's confidence in its ability to detect an undeclared
proliferation programme.
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